Are grain markets in Niger driven by speculation? by Araujo Bonjean, Catherine & Simonet, Catherine
Are grain markets in Niger driven by speculation?
Catherine Araujo Bonjean, Catherine Simonet
To cite this version:
Catherine Araujo Bonjean, Catherine Simonet. Are grain markets in Niger driven by specula-
tion?. 2011.28. 2012. <halshs-00626409v2>
HAL Id: halshs-00626409
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00626409v2
Submitted on 27 Sep 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.28 
 
 1
  
 
C E N T R E  D ' E T U D E S  
E T  D E  R E C H E R C H E S  
S U R  L E  D E V E L O P P E M E N T  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
 
 
 
Document de travail de la série 
Etudes et Documents 
E 2011.28 
 
Are grain markets in Niger driven by speculation? 
 
Catherine Araujo Bonjean 
Catherine Simonet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
nd
 version 
Septembre 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERDI  
65  BD. F. MITTERRAND 
63000  CLERMONT FERRAND - FRANCE 
TEL. 04  73  17 74 00   
FAX  04  73  17  74  28 
www.cerdi.org
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.28 
 
 2
 
Les auteurs 
 
 
Catherine Araujo Bonjean  
CNRS Researcher, Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, CNRS, UMR 6587, Centre 
d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), F-63009 Clermont-
Ferrand, France Email : catherine.araujo-bonjean@udamail.fr 
 
Catherine Simonet 
PhD student, Clermont Université, Université d’Auvergne, CNRS, UMR 6587, Centre d’Etudes 
et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), F-63009 Clermont-Ferrand, 
France  
Email : cat.simonet@gmail.com 
 
Corresponding author: catherine.araujo-bonjean@udamail.fr 
 
 
 
 
 
La série des Etudes et Documents du CERDI est consultable sur le site : 
http://www.cerdi.org/ed 
 
 
Directeur de la publication : Patrick Plane 
Directeur de la rédaction : Catherine Araujo Bonjean 
Responsable d’édition : Annie Cohade 
ISSN : 2114-7957 
 
 
 
 
Avertissement :  
Les commentaires et analyses développés n’engagent que leurs auteurs qui restent seuls 
responsables des erreurs et insuffisances. 
  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.28 
 
 3
 
 
Abstract 
Over the last two decades, millet prices in Niger have enjoyed periods of spectacular increase 
during which they seem to go well above their fundamental value. These episodes of price 
bursts followed by rapid reversals could be attributed to the presence of rational speculative 
bubbles. Considering millet as a food asset we have developed a pricing model, and tested for 
the presence of periodically and partially collapsing bubbles for 15 millet markets in Niger. 
The test strategy consists of estimating the fundamental value of millet and investigating the 
dynamic properties of price deviations from fundamentals. A battery of unit root tests aimed 
at controlling for skewness and kurtosis, and for non linearity in the bubble process, is 
implemented. These tests do not reject the presence of rational bubbles for some of the sample 
markets, and allow the identification of expanding and collapsing phases in bubble processes. 
The results show that small markets, located in deficit and remote areas are more prone to 
speculation than large markets in the main producing and consuming regions. 
 
 
Key word: periodically collapsing bubbles, M-TAR, Markov switching ADF, Residual 
Augmented ADF test, Rolling ADF test, millet, Niger 
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Introduction 
Over the past 20 years, grain markets in Niger have experienced numerous large 
positive price shocks followed by rapid reversals. These shocks, whose duration is typically 
less than one year, are transitory, but constitute a threat to poor households which are 
dependent on markets for food security. Indeed, these periods of price spikes sometimes lead 
to severe food crises, as was the case in Niger in 2005. 
Recurrent episodes of high local food grain prices are mostly related to a rainfall shock 
and a deficit in domestic production. However, the extent of the food deficit and the price 
increase are not closely related. This may be due to the difficulty of measuring grain 
production. Millet is produced by numerous small farms scattered throughout the country, and 
production is poorly recorded. In fact, production data are revised several times during the 
growing season and corrected several months after the harvest. Measurement errors may 
therefore explain the low correlation between prices and production. 
Non-competitive markets may also explain the apparent discrepancies between prices 
and food availability. In developing countries, traders are often considered as responsible for 
grain price increases. They are blamed for taking advantage of their monopsony power, and 
for speculative stockholding. However, another explanation can be found in Sen’s work on 
the origin of famines when there is no decline in food availability. For instance, Ravallion 
(1985) showed that the 1974 famine in Bangladesh cannot be explained by a rice production 
deficit, but by stockholders’ over-optimistic price expectations. Such market “irrational 
exuberance” has been shown for stock markets, but few works aim at studying this 
phenomenon on commodity markets in developing countries.  
The presence of rational speculative bubbles can explain the dramatic price increases 
followed by a sudden reversal that have been observed at different periods of time in the grain 
markets of Niger. It may also explain why the early warning system for preventing food 
crises, which is mainly based on the monitoring of crop growth, has not been  effective in 
anticipating steep rises in prices despite technological advances that allow  more accurate 
monitoring of harvests. 
Rational speculative bubbles result from a self-fulfilling belief based on intrinsically 
irrelevant information that is not related to market fundamentals (Diba and Grossman, 1988). 
For instance, if the economic actors anticipate an increase in grain price whereas these 
expectations are not based on changes in the fundamentals, the grain demand will increase 
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moving the price away from its intrinsic value. A rational bubble is consistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis and the no arbitrage condition. It can be derived from a basic asset 
pricing model assuming competitive markets and rational expectations with no informational 
asymmetries. Agents know that the asset is overvalued, but they are prepared to pay more for 
the asset than its intrinsic value if they expect to sell it at an even higher price. The bubble 
increases at the required rate of return and bursts when agents’ expectations return to normal.  
In Niger, investors in the grain market operate in a highly uncertain environment that 
is likely to favour self-fulfilling beliefs. Information on the climatic and agronomic conditions 
of crops, and on economic variables, is generally very poor. Moreover interventions of the 
government and external aid agencies in case of food risk are often unpredictable. As a result, 
incomplete or unreliable information provided by the public authorities may fuel speculative 
bubbles. 
Rational speculative bubbles are difficult to detect but there is now an abundant 
literature which aims to test for the existence of rational bubbles on stock markets. In this 
paper, we consider millet as a food asset that can be held for long periods. Using a model for a 
storable good we show that, like other financial assets, the price of millet depends on a 
fundamental component and a potential rational bubble. Following Evans (1991) we consider 
a specific class of rational bubbles i.e. periodically and partially collapsing speculative 
bubbles (PCB). PCBs are non linear processes; they are explosive during the phase of bubble 
eruption, but they may be stationary over the whole sample period. To test for the presence of 
such bubbles our empirical strategy consists first in estimating the bubble component of prices 
- taken as the difference between the millet market price and its fundamental value. Then, we 
explore the statistical properties of bubbles. First, we use the residual augmented least squares 
Dickey-Fuller test to correct for skewness and kurtosis. Second, we test for asymmetry in the 
bubble process by using non linear unit rot tests based on a M-TAR model and on a Markov 
switching model. Third, rolling ADF tests are conducted to detect explosiveness in bubble 
dynamics. The results do not reject the presence of rational bubbles on 9 markets among the 
15 markets under study, but reject the presence of bubbles on the main markets of Niger.  
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 1 outlines the main 
characteristics of millet prices during the last two decades. Section 2 presents the rational 
bubble model for millet, and the theoretical characteristics of bubbles. The fundamental value 
of millet is estimated in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the non linear unit root test.  
Section 5 covers the rolling ADF tests. Section 6 offers conclusions. 
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1. Millet price fluctuations in Niger since 1990  
In Niger millet is the staple diet of the local population, and the main food crop. It 
covers 65 % of cultivated land and represents about ¾ of cereal production (IRD, 2009). This 
is the most suitable crop for the arid and semi-arid areas of Niger. It is a rain fed crop 
cultivated by small traditional farmers using low input agricultural practices. As a 
consequence, millet production is highly vulnerable to pest attacks and weather conditions. 
Millet can be stored for more than one year. Three categories of agents hold stocks: 
farmers, wholesalers and the public authorities. Most grain is stored at the farm level, but 
these stocks are difficult to assess. As a general rule, stocks are built up during the harvest 
season and held for at least one year. They are intended to cover the household’s food needs 
until the next harvest, and meet the farm’s demand for seeds. However, many farmers with 
low production levels are net buyers of grain. Their production may not be sufficient to cover 
their food needs, or they may be forced to sell millet early in the crop marketing season to 
meet their cash needs. Wholesalers hold stocks over short periods, generally not exceeding 
two months, with the result that the rate of stock turnover is high (Aker, 2010). Public safety 
stocks are renewed by tender during the first months of the year1.  
The production cycle generates large seasonal price fluctuations. Millet prices are 
lower during the harvest and post-harvest season from September to January. Then they 
gradually go up and reach their peak at the end of the lean season2 from July to September. 
The amplitude of the seasonal movement in prices is particularly big in Niger where prices 
rise on average by 40% between January and August. 
Millet is the subject of intensive cross-border trade in West Africa, but it is not traded 
on international markets. Niger is structurally an importer of millet. Its main source of imports 
is Nigeria, but imports from Mali and Burkina Faso have been expanding during the last 
decade. Because weather conditions are similar within the countries of the sub-region, trans-
border trade does not really play a regulating role. The dampening effect of trade on prices is 
weak, and millet prices are subject to large variations from one year to the next. 
                                                 
1
 Unfortunately, information on the level of public stocks and dates of operation is not available. 
2
 The lean season is the period that precedes the harvest during which granaries are depleted. 
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Figure 1. Millet prices in Niger, Fcfa/kg, January 1990 to October 2008 
 
Source: SIMA 
A market information system (SIMA) was implemented in Niger at the end of the 
1980s that collects market prices for major agricultural products. Market price information is 
disseminated to producers, consumers and traders through the media. SIMA has now 
accumulated a large amount of data and can trace the evolution of food prices in a large 
geographical area, and for a wide range of commodities.  
We selected a sample of 15 millet markets from the markets covered by the SIMA. 
Market selection was based on the quality of available information: markets for which too 
many data are missing were dropped from our sample. The selected sample includes a variety 
of markets that differ according to their location - remote area, border proximity, production 
area or urban area. The observation period starts in January 1990 and ends in October 2008. 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of millet prices during the last two decades. Except for 
N’Guimi at the end of the period, prices follow a common trend punctuated by large positive 
shocks. Figure 2 focuses on the evolution of real millet price in the capital city, Niamey, 
relative to the cumulated rainfall during the preceding year3. Considering that rainfall is the 
main component of the fundamental value of millet, Figure 2 shows periods during which 
prices deviate from their fundamental value. 
                                                 
3
 The rainfall variable is delayed to take into account the production cycle. 
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Except for the 2008 shock that corresponded to the international food crisis, most of 
the episodes of price boom have been recorded after a rainfall deficit. This was the case in 
1996-1998 and 2005. The price increase during 1996-1998 corresponded to three consecutive 
years of rainfall deficit, the largest price increase being registered in 1997. Prices again 
reached high levels in 2005, after the 2004 drought. Note that the severer drought registered 
during the 1990 rainy season did not result in a sharp price increase in 1991.  
The unusual price changes in 1994 are partly the consequence of the Franc CFA 
devaluation. The severe rainfall deficit recorded during the 1993 rainy season, the most 
important deficit during the period investigated, was not followed by a sharp increase in millet 
prices (Figure 1). In real terms the millet price fell due to the high level of inflation generated 
by the devaluation (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Price shocks in Niamey and rainfall shocks 
 
Source: SIMA and author’s calculations 
Shocks are calculated on an annual basis as the difference between the price (cumulated 
rainfall) level at year t and the mean price (cumulated rainfall) for the 1990-2008 period. They 
are expressed as a percentage of the mean 
 
A more puzzling situation occurred in 2001-2002. After two consecutive years of 
excess rainfall, a small rainfall deficit generated a sharp price increase in 2001. Moreover, the 
price kept increasing in 2002, whereas the rainfall level was above its mean. In 1992 also, 
millet price registered a positive shock that was not related to a rainfall deficit. These 
abnormal price evolutions relative to rainfall may reflect the presence of speculative bubbles.  
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2. A rational bubble model for millet 
According to the preceding observations, speculative behaviour on millet markets may 
have exacerbated climate shock effects, leading to price spikes and increased food insecurity.  
Before proceeding to econometric tests for the existence of bubbles, we develop a simple 
asset-pricing model assuming rational expectations. We then focus on a specific class of 
rational bubbles and highlight their statistical properties.   
The millet pricing model 
We consider a simple model for millet price with linear supply and demand4. Market 
equilibrium is given by the set of equations (1) – (3).  
Net supply (Q) in period t is positively related to the current price of millet: 
tttt bPaQ ε++=    b > 0      (1) 
Pt is the millet price level in period t 
at is an index that depends on current and lagged values of yt a vector of exogenous supply 
and demand variables.  
Farmers and traders withhold supply if they expect the future price to be sufficiently 
high to compensate for storage costs and losses. Assuming risk-neutral stockholders, demand 
for stocks in period t (St) is positively related to the price spread between the future expected 
price and the current price:  
tttttt wdPPEcS ++−= + )( 1   c > 0      (2) 
dt is an index that depends on a vector of variables reflecting the opportunity cost of holding 
millet. 
1+tt PE is the expected price of millet in period t+1 . 
Et is the conditional expectations operator. 
εt and wt are zero-mean, finite variance, serially uncorrelated disturbance terms. They are for 
unaccounted variables on the demand and supply side.  
The millet market equilibrium is given by: 
                                                 
4
 This model draws on Ravallion (1985), Hwa (1979), Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990), Quddus et Becker (2000). 
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 1−+= ttt SQS           (3) 
St-1 is the initial stock.   
The market clearing price solves equation (3) at each point in time so that: 
 ttttt xPPE µλ ++=+1          (4) 
where: 
c
cb +
=λ  > 1 and ttt dax −=  1−+−= tttt Swεµ    
xt is a forcing variable; it is an index that depends on a vector of variables reflecting market 
fundamentals. µt is an error term including the initial stocks, which accounts for unobserved 
variables to the researcher.  
Equation (4) relates the current millet price to the next period’s expected price, 
variables determining fundamentals and to an unobserved variable (µ). It is a first order 
difference equation in P. Given that the eigenvalue of the system ( λ ) is greater than unity, the 
forward-looking solution of equation (4) for P involves two components:  
ttt FBP +=           (5) 
Ft is the market-fundamentals component and Bt is a potential rational-bubbles 
component (Blanchard, 1979; Blanchard and Watson, 1982; Diba and Grossman; 1987, 
1988).  
Under the assumption that Et(xt+j+µt+j) does not grow at a geometric rate equal or 
greater than λ, Ft is a convergent sum (Diba and Grossman, 1987):  
)(
0
)1(
it
i
it
i
tt xEF +
∞
=
+
+− += ∑ µλ         (6) 
The market-fundamentals component of the millet price relates to the expected value 
of the exogenous variables determining supply and demand.  
In contrast to the fundamental component, the bubble part, Bt, is not stationary. Bt is 
the solution to the homogenous expectational difference equation: 
01 =−+ ttt BBE λ          (7) 
If Bt is different from zero there exists a rational bubble that is self-fulfilling. The 
conditional expectations of the bubble are explosive:  
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t
j
jtt BBE λ=+   for all  j > 0         (8) 
The presence of a self-fulfilling rational bubble does not violate the no arbitrage 
condition. The bubble is expected to grow at the required rate of return.   
Periodically and partially collapsing bubbles  
Following Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Evans (1991), we focus on a class of 
rational stochastic bubbles that periodically collapse and regenerate: the so called Periodically 
Collapsing Bubble (PCB) given by (9a) and (9b):  
11 ++ = ttt uBB λ     if Bt ≤ c     (9a) 
( ) 1111 +−++ 



−+= tttt uBB δλθpi
λδ   if Bt > c     (9b) 
δ and θ are positive parameters. ut+1 is an exogenous independently and identically 
distributed positive random variable with Etut+1 = 1. θt +1 takes the value 1 with probability pi 
and 0 with probability 1- pi, where 0 < pi < 1. 
The PCB process switches between two regimes depending on the bubble being above 
or below the threshold value c.  
This bubble process satisfies equation (7) since the expected growth rate of the bubble 
is always λ. For Bt < c the bubble increases slowly at mean rate λ; if Bt rises above the 
threshold it expands faster at the mean rate λpi-1 , but may collapse with probability 1- pi. The 
bubble grows at a higher rate during expanding phases to compensate the investor for the 
possibility of collapse. When the bubble collapses, its growth rate falls to a mean value of δ, 
and the process begins again (Evans, 1991). 
This type of bubble not only accounts for occasional asset price crashes but also for 
rapid run-ups in asset prices before a crash. 
3. The fundamental value of millet  
To test for the presence of periodically collapsing bubbles we first need an empirical 
model for the fundamental value of millet. Following Pindyck and Rottemberg (1990), we 
assume that forecasts of xt in equation (6) are based on its current and past values. xt includes 
observable exogenous variables that determine millet supply and demand, and all relevant 
information about future net supply.   
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Most previous studies have shown that millet markets in Niger are fairly well spatially 
integrated (Araujo et al., 2010). As a consequence the fundamental value of millet in Niger is 
assumed to be determined at the country level. The fundamental value is only allowed to vary 
between markets by a constant term. These market specific effects catch differences in price 
level that are related to the geographical location of markets. In other words, specific effects 
measure fixed transaction costs associated with the location of markets.  
The fundamental value of millet is therefore estimated using panel data for the 15 
millet markets for the period 1990-2008. The estimated equation is given by (10):  
itist
s
sttttit MGasolineCPIallCumulRainfallRainfP νεϕαααα ++++++= ∑
=
12
1
4321 .  (10) 
Pit is the millet price on market i at time t. Rainfallt is the monthly rainfall level. This 
is an information variable that is useful to predict the future harvest. Cumul rainfallt is the 
cumulated level of rainfall over the rainy season (from May to October) in the main 
production area5. It takes a constant value from October t-1 to September t (the crop year). 
This is an exogenous variable which aims to capture the state of millet availability for the 
current period. Gasolinet is the price of gasoline in Niger. This variable is a proxy for 
production and trade costs that vary with the oil price. CPIt is the consumer price index in 
Niger. Ms are monthly dummies that capture seasonal price variations. εi are market specific 
fixed effects. νit is the error term. It includes all factors not explained by right-hand variables.  
The fitted value of Pit is taken as a measure of the fundamental value of millet; νit is 
the apparent deviation of the price in the i market from its fundamental value at time t.  
Estimation results are given in Table 1. As expected, gasoline price enters positively in 
the fundamental equation. The current rainfall level and the cumulated rainfall level, which 
represent, respectively, the future harvest and the current availability of millet, negatively 
affect the fundamental value of millet. Mean prices in Maradi, Zinder, Dogondoutchi, Gouré, 
which are located in the main producing region of Niger, close to the Nigerian border, are 
below the average price level. Mean price is highest in N’Guimi, which is located in a remote 
                                                 
5Rainfall data come from Global Air Temperature and Precipitation: Gridded Monthly and Annual Time Series 
(Version2.01) interpolated and documented by Cort J. Willmott and Kenji Matsuura (with support from IGES 
and NASA), University of Deleware. For more information see Legates et al. (1990a 1990b) and Willmott and 
Matsuura (1995). The data base gives monthly precipitation for the 1900-2008 period, interpolated to a 0.5 by 
0.5 degree grid resolution. The variables Rainfall and Cumulated rainfall are respectively the mean rainfall level 
and the mean cumulated rainfall level calculated on observations below 14 degrees latitude (considered as the 
limit of the production area in Niger). 
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area, close to the border with Chad. Prices are also higher in Niamey (Katako), the main 
consumption market of Niger. 
Table 1. Estimation of the fundamental value of millet 
Dependent variable: current millet price   Fixed effects 
Gasoline 0.039  Agadez 4.683 
 (0.000)  Diffa 7.436 
CPI 1.995  Dosso 9.441 
 (0.000)  Gaya -5.337 
Cumulated Rainfall -0.225 
 Katako 
(Niamey) 11.846 
 (0.000)  Maradi -25.684 
Rainfall -0.202  Tahoua 14.119 
 (0.000)  Zinder -20.859 
Monthly fixed effects yes  Goudoumaria 1.702 
Cross-section fixed effect yes  Nguimi 19.625 
Adjusted R-squared 0.753  Dogondoutchi -15.798 
No. of obs 3331  Loga -5.704 
  
 Filingue 0.484 
  
 Goure -11.427 
  
 Tillaberi 15.567 
P-value in parenthesis. Stationarity tests are given in the appendix. 
 
As an illustration, Figure 3 shows the estimated fundamental component of the millet 
price in Niamey (Katako market). The deviation between the current price and the 
fundamental component represents the bubble part. This figure highlights four periods during 
which the millet price in Katako rose dramatically beyond its fundamental value - 1998, 2001, 
2002 and 2005. A deeper analysis shows that apparent bubbles break out at the beginning of 
the lean season, and end with the arrival of the new harvest (Araujo and al., 2012) In other 
words, prices increase exponentially from March/April to July/August; they then crash to their 
initial level within one or two months.  
Figure 3. Fundamental component of the millet price in Katako (Niamey) (Fcfa/kg) 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Fundamental value Current price
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.28 
 
 14
The standard ADF test (table 2) rejects the unit root null hypothesis for apparent 
bubbles in all markets. However this test is not very informative when data exhibit both 
skewness and excess kurtosis which is the case. The Jarque Bera test rejects normality for all 
markets except Maradi and Loga, at the 5 % confidence level (table 2). Note that non 
normality is consistent with the presence of periodically collapsing bubbles (Taylor and Peel, 
1998; Payne and Waters, 2007).  
So we have implemented the residuals-augmented Dickey-Fuller (RADF) test, 
developed by Taylor and Peel (1998)6, which is robust to skewness and kurtosis in the 
distribution of the residual term.  t-tests in the RADF equation (table 2) confirm the presence 
of skewness and kurtosis in the potential bubbles. The RADF test does not reject the unit root 
hypothesis for four of the 15 markets under study - Dogondoutchi, Gouré, Katako and 
N’Guimi. This test is more powerful than the ADF test in detecting periodically collapsing 
bubbles, but it does not alone provide sufficient evidence for the presence of bubbles.  
4. Testing for asymmetry in the bubble process  
As shown by many authors (see for instance Evans, 1991; Charemza and Deadman 
1995; van Norden and Vigfusson, 1996; Waters, 2008), linear unit root tests are not able to 
detect collapsing bubbles which only exhibit characteristic bubble properties during the 
expansion phase. Therefore, we implement two non linear unit root tests looking for 
asymmetry in the bubble process. 
We use first a generalization of the Dickey-Fuller test proposed by Enders and 
Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) that relies on a momentum threshold 
autoregressive (M-TAR) model. As shown by Payne and Waters (2007) and Bohl (2003), the 
M-TAR model is well suited when the adjustment exhibits more momentum in one direction 
than the other. This is the case for PCBs which increase exponentially until they reach a 
certain threshold level and suddenly collapse.  
 
                                                 
6
 See also Im and Schmidt (2008). 
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Table 2. Bubbles’ characteristics  
 Agadez Diffa Dogondoutchi Dosso Filingué Gaya Goudoumaria Gouré Katako Loga Maradi N’Guimi Tahoua Tillabéri Zinder 
No of Obs. 226 221 217 226 210 226 215 226 226 216 226 218 226 226 226 
Skewness 0.736 0.611 0.326 0.571 0.700 0.433 1.354 0.405 0.501 0.315 -0.027 0.710 1.065 0.504 0.864 
Kurtosis 4.307 3.123 2.600 3.350 3.788 3.324 6.371 3.979 3.435 2.777 2.668 3.107 5.518 3.705 7.038 
Jarque Bera 36.509 13.872 5.289 13.412 22.589 8.042 167.527 15.223 11.215 4.028 1.067 18.405 102.420 14.257 181.679 
Prob 0.000 0.001 0.071 0.001 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.133 0.587 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
ADF test (1) 
               
φ -0.166 -0.161 -0.200 -0.150 -0.319 -0.237 -0.276 -0.153 -0.142 -0.160 -0.149 -0.169 -0.213 -0.255 -0.223 
t-stat -4.509 -4.288 -4.760 -4.265 -6.139 -5.487 -5.618 -4.259 -3.975 -4.036 -4.136 -4.346 -5.190 -5.705 -5.280 
RADF test (2) 
               
θ -0.172 -0.135 -0.101 -0.133 -0.210 -0.181 -0.151 -0.094 -0.099 - - -0.123 -0.166 -0.215 -0.159 
τA -5.092 -3.973 -2.715 -4.248 -4.444 -4.541 -3.699 -2.767 -3.151 - - -3.391 -4.539 -5.210 -4.386 
t-stat : Kurtosis 4.223 7.569 8.746 4.787 9.169 6.969 12.666 7.277 7.751 - - 7.139 8.725 4.116 8.703 
t-stat : Skewness 2.426 2.640 0.252 1.398 1.107 2.021 -1.221 1.678 0.609 - - -0.004 4.858 1.032 -4.281 
(1): Test equation: t
p
k
ktktt uBBB ∑
=
−−
+∆+=∆
1
1 ψφ (2): Test equation: tttt wBB ξγθ ++=∆ − ˆ1  (see details in the appendix). 
Critical value for τA : -3.54 at the 5% level (Sarno and Taylor 2003 for a sample size equal to 156 observations) 
 
Table 3. Results from the M-TAR model  
 Agadez Diffa Dogondoutchi Dosso Filingué Gaya Goudoumaria Gouré Katako Loga Maradi N'Guimi Tahoua Tillabéri Zinder 
ρ1 -0.124 -0.190 -0.143 -0.093 -0.226 -0.167 -0.154 -0.040 -0.190 -0.169 -0.198 -0.124 -0.097 -0.286 -0.129 
t-stat -2.471 -4.362 -3.067 -1.951 -3.342 -2.805 -2.439 -0.816 -4.540 -3.684 -4.802 -2.698 -1.568 -4.562 -2.319 
ρ2 -0.218 -0.076 -0.404 -0.220 -0.479 -0.315 -0.461 -0.277 -0.016 -0.118 -0.003 -0.286 -0.303 -0.222 -0.350 
t-stat -4.003 -1.021 -4.463 -4.218 -5.934 -5.035 -6.141 -5.443 -0.240 -1.598 -0.040 -3.892 -5.580 -3.465 -5.470 
                
R² adj 0.087 0.081 0.120 0.085 0.187 0.126 0.171 0.116 0.081 0.068 0.090 0.092 0.128 0.125 0.133 
threshold 3.714 12.893 11.977 1.526 10.249 5.800 13.239 4.483 10.958 8.209 6.463 13.176 3.347 2.387 5.069 
F-tests 
               
Φ 1.621 1.768 6.566 3.249 5.811 2.953 9.776 11.397 4.697 0.334 5.676 3.484 6.334 0.507 6.818 
proba 0.204 0.185 0.011 0.073 0.017 0.087 0.002 0.001 0.031 0.564 0.018 0.063 0.013 0.477 0.010 
ρ1=ρ2=0 11.067 10.033 14.663 10.802 23.193 16.611 21.829 15.147 10.335 8.062 11.529 11.213 16.800 16.411 17.647 
No. obs 224 217 209 224 198 224 207 224 224.000 208 224 212 224 224 224 
Critical values for H0: ρ1  = ρ2 = 0 : 5.58 (10 %); 6.62 (5%); 8.82 (1%) (Enders and Siklos, 2001). 
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The M-TAR equation for the bubble component of millet price (B) is given by:  
∑
=
−−−
+∆++−=∆
l
i
titittttt BBIBIB
1
1211)1( εγρρ     (11) 
It is an indicator function that depends on the level of ∆Bt-1:  




<∆
≥∆
=
−
−
τ
τ
1
1
,0
,1
t
t
t Bif
Bif
I
 
 τ  is the unknown threshold value. εt is an iid process with zero mean and constant variance. 
The M-TAR model allows the speed and direction of adjustment, ρ1 and ρ2, to depend 
on the previous period’s change in Bt. Following Payne and Waters (2007) our test strategy is 
based on the test of the null hypothesis of symmetry when the null of unit root is rejected. The 
rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment with ρ2>ρ1 is evidence for the 
presence of a periodically collapsing bubble. Bohl (2003) demonstrated that this test has 
sufficient power to detect asymmetry when the DGP is given by the Evans’ bubble model. If 
the estimated coefficient, ρ2, is statistically significant and negative, and larger in absolute 
terms than ρ1, there is evidence of a sharp correction when prices rise above a certain 
threshold relative to fundamentals. 
The threshold value τ is estimated using the Chan (1993) procedure, searching over all 
potential threshold values so as to minimize the sum of squared errors from the fitted model. 
The lag length is selected according to the Akaike information criterion. 
Under the null hypothesis of a unit root in Bt, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. The distribution for the test 
statistic is not standard; the critical values are provided by Enders and Granger (1998) and 
Enders and Siklos (2001). The null hypothesis of symmetry is tested by the restriction, ρ1 = ρ2 
using the usual F-statistics (Φ). 
The M-TAR estimation results (Table 3) lead to the rejection of the unit root 
hypothesis for all series. The F tests reject symmetry of adjustment at the 5% confidence level 
for six markets:- Dogondoutchi, Filingué, Goudoumaria, Gouré, Tahoua and Zinder. As a 
consequence, the presence of speculative bubbles cannot be rejected for these markets. We 
note that symmetry of adjustment is rejected at the 10% confidence level for three other 
markets: - Dosso, Gaya and N-Guimi. Symmetry of adjustment is also rejected for Maradi and 
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Katako, but the coefficients ρ1 and ρ2 do not satisfy the condition ρ2>ρ1. These results 
therefore do not provide evidence for speculative bubbles on the Maradi and Katako markets. 
An alternative test for asymmetry in the bubble process is given by the Markov 
switching ADF (MS-ADF) tests developed by Hall, Psaradakis and Sola (1999). This test is 
based on a two state Markov Switching Model allowing for the possibility of two regimes in 
the data generating process: the data are non-stationary in one regime and stationary in the 
other one, collapsing back towards the fundamental solution. The probability of observing the 
collapsing regime is assumed to follow a first order Markov process. Evidence that one 
regime is non-stationary, possibly with an explosive root, while the other is stationary, 
indicates the presence of a bubble.  
The Markov Switching specification, with a stochastic transition from one state to the 
other, is less restrictive than the M-TAR model, but further from the original model of Evans, 
where the transition from one state to the other is deterministic, depending on the bubble 
growth rate. However, the main advantage of the Markov switching model compared to the 
M-TAR model is to allow for a non-stationary regime. 
The Markov switching ADF test equation is given by (12):   
[ ] [ ] [ ] tttkt
p
k
tktktttttt eSSBSSBSSSSB 10
1
1011010 )1()1()1()1( σσψψββµµ +−+∆+−++−++−=∆ −
=
− ∑
   with  )1,0(~ Ne t          (12) 
where St is a discrete-valued random variable that can take two values (0 or 1). If St = 0, the 
process is in regime 1; if St = 1, the process is in regime 2. The random sequence {St} is 
specified as a homogeneous Markov chain (see Hamilton, 1994) with transition probabilities:   
Pr{ St = 1|St-1 = 1} = p ; Pr{ St = 0|St-1 = 1} = 1- p ;  
Pr{ St = 0|St-1 = 0} = q ; Pr{ St = 1|St-1 = 0} = 1- q     (13) 
This specification allows all parameters, including the variance of the residual term, to 
vary according to the regime. The bubble process is expected to be non-stationary, possibly 
with an explosive root (β0 ≥ 0), in one regime, and stationary in the other (β1 < 0)7. The unit 
root test is based on the t-ratios associated with the maximum likelihood estimates of β0 and 
β1. The null hypotheses β0 = 0 and β1 = 0 are tested against, respectively, the one-sided 
alternative β0 > 0, or β1 < 0. Since the null distribution of the test statistics is unknown, 
                                                 
7
 By convenience the non stationary regime is set to be regime 1 and the stationary regime is set to be regime 2.  
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simulated critical values are obtained by parametrically bootstrapping the null model 
(corresponding to β0 = β1 = 0) using the estimates of µ0, µ1, ψ 0k, ψ 1k, σ0 and σ1t. Estimation 
results are given in table 48,9. 
Table 4. Results from the Markov-switching ADF test 
 Agadez Maradi Zinder Dosso Gaya Tillabéri Katako Goure Tahoua 
β0 -0.088 -0.023 -0.088 -0.009 -0.035 -0.266 -0.0038 0.032 0.0256 
(t-stat) (-2.258) (-0.751) (-2.631) (-0.250) (-0.908) (-6.027) (-0.129) (0.330) (0.610) 
          
β1 -0.298** -0.852* -0.630 -0.333** -0.515** -0.668** -0.562** -0.641*** -0.923** 
(t-stat) (-4.263) (-4.423) (-2.830) (-3.845) (-4.806) (-10.812) (-4.171) (-19.363) (-11.986) 
   
 
      
µ0 -3.222   -1.997  -1.602   1.062 
(t-stat) (-3.916)   (-2.644)  (-1.676)   (1.002) 
   
 
                                                                                                                                
µ1 5.987   4.515  48.127   -2.095 
(t-stat) (2.852)   (1.773)  (15.581)   (-0.739) 
   
 
      
σ²1 46.513 92.533 101.745 47.194 108.148 180.430 60.303 109.937 175.666 
(t-stat) (6.066) (7.951) (10.909) (7.153) (6.905) (9.714) (8.842) (6.845) (7.784) 
   
 
      
σ²2 351.747 284.232 1659.485 436.003 829.100 36.797 460.400 235.501 141.595 
(t-stat) (6.970) (1.779) (3.454) (6.371) (5.743) (1.314) (4.204) (2.819) (2.771) 
p 0.80 0.31 0.93 0.73 0.81 0.98 0.84 0.86 0.89 
(P-value) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
q 0.74 0.88 0.20 0.51 0.58 0.45 0.26 0.48 0.54 
(P-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log likelihood 
        
 
-888.157 -873.014 -884.296 -886.130 -953.400 -917.674 -854.070 -889.367 -919.769 
Expected duration of regimes (months): 
      
Regime 1 4.99 8.47 14.93 3.73 5.21 46.72 6.31 7.02 8.85 
Regime 2 3.89 1.46 1.26 2.05 2.39 1.81 1.34 1.92 2.18 
Critical value for β0 t-stat        
10% 1.455 3.763 2.400 1.296 2.397 2.412 1.680 3.389 2.719 
5% 1.849 4.423 4.615 1.924 3.675 4.898 2.486 4.578 4.085 
1% 3.746 7.553 13.045 5.233 10.649 12.105 4.926 10.050 8.701 
Critical value for β1 t-stat        
10% -2.919 -3.898 -3.084 -3.008 -2.975 -1.977 -2.632 -3.981 -4.297 
5% -3.391 -5.579 -5.149 -3.825 -3.936 -7.467 -3.554 -4.914 -5.161 
1% -6.463 -13.903 -9.584 -7.040 -13.466 -14.801 -7.214 -12.546 -13.529 
Critical values calculated from parametric bootstrap with 500 replications 
The results in Table 4 show two distinct regimes - a unit root regime (regime 1), and a 
stationary regime (regime 2). In the unit root regime the coefficient β0 is close to zero, but 
negative, except for the bubble processes in Goure and Tahoua. In this regime t-stats are well 
above standard values. However, comparing these test statistics to bootstrap critical values, 
                                                 
8
 MS-ADF test cannot be computed for series with missing values. 
9
 Estimations have been performed using the Matlab toolbox: MS_Regress. See: Perlin, M. (2010), 
“MS_Refgress – the MATLAB Package for Markov regime Switching Models”, available at: SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1714016 
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the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the explosive root alternative for any 
market.  
Regime 2 captures the collapsing phase of bubbles. In this regime the coefficient β1 is 
large in absolute value, indicating a sharp correction in millet price disequilibria. The unit root 
null hypothesis is rejected for the stationary alternative at the 1% level for Gouré, Tahoua and 
Tillaberi, and at the 10 % level for the other markets, except for Zinder.  
The unit root regime dominates over the whole period. This regime lasts, on average, 
for seven months. The expected duration of the collapsing regime is short, equal to two 
months on average. This regime is also characterised by higher volatility (except for 
Tillaberi), than the non stationary regime. 
As an illustration, Figure 4 depicts the inferred probabilities of being in each regime 
for the bubble process in Gaya. The model clearly identifies five periods of collapse in the 
bubble process10 - September 1994, August 1998, July-September 2002, September 2003 and 
August 2005. These periods of collapse are roughly the same for the other markets. 
Figure 4. Probabilities of expanding and collapsing regimes in Gaya  
 
 
Results from the switching ADF tests corroborate the previous ones derived from the 
M-TAR model. They show strong evidence of collapse episodes, but detect only weak 
evidence of explosive root, with the exception of two series, Goure and Tahoua, both of 
which present the two salient characteristics of periodically collapsing bubbles. By contrast, 
                                                 
10
 With a probability of being in the collapsing regime larger than 0.95. 
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the Tillaberi series, which is stationary in both regimes, does not present any bubble 
characteristics. Results for the other markets are more divergent. 
The failure of switching ADF tests to detect periods of explosive behaviour in the 
bubble component of millet prices may be due to the short-lived nature of bubbles. Indeed, the 
number of observations from an explosive period relative to the sample size is low. The tests 
conducted in the next part of this paper address this issue.  
5. Testing for explosive behaviour in the bubble component 
 Focusing on the expansion phase of bubbles we implant the rolling ADF test 
developed by Phillips, Wu and Yu (2009). The rolling ADF test allows detection of  explosive 
behaviour and  location of  the start and end dates of the bubble. It is expected to perform 
better than the previous tests in detecting short-lived bubbles.  
The procedure consists in testing iteratively the unit root null hypothesis against the 
right-tailed alternative hypothesis of explosive process. The test equation is given by (14): 
∑
=
−−
+∆++=∆
J
j
tjtjtt BBB
1
1 εφδµ  tε ~ NID(0, σ²)   (14) 
The unit root null hypothesis is H0: δ = 1; the right-tailed alternative hypothesis is H1: δ > 1.  
Under the rolling ADF test procedure, equation (14) is estimated repeatedly on a 
rolling subsample of size n. The first subsample includes the first observation to the nth 
observation. The second subsample includes the second observation to the (n+1)th 
observation. The ADFr statistic is computed for each rolling subsample. In order to detect 
short-lived bubbles the test is implemented for low subsample sizes, being aware that 
coefficients may be poorly estimated when the sample size is too small 
The origination date and the collapse date of the explosive process can be identified 
comparing the rolling ADF test statistics with corresponding critical values. The bubble phase 
is given by the consecutive time intervals during which the ADF test statistic is significant. 
More precisely, we consider that the end date of a bubble is given by the last observation of 
the sample corresponding to the most significant test statistic. The origination date of bubble 
will be the first observation of the sample corresponding to the smaller but significant test 
statistic. The critical values for each subsample size are computed using Monte Carlo 
simulations with 100,000 replications. Test results are reported in table 5 and in figure A1 in 
the appendix. 
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 Table 5 gives the estimated coefficient (δ), and the corresponding t-statistic, for the 
most significant ADF test, and for different sub-sample sizes. Rolling ADF tests for n=25 do 
not reject the null of unit root in favour of the right-tailed alternative at the 5% significance 
level for 5 markets - Dosso, Gaya, Katako, Maradi and Tillaberi. According to these results 
there is no significant evidence of speculative bubbles in the main markets of Niger. Maradi, 
Dosso, and Gaya are major markets located in the main producing region; Katako is the main 
market of the capital Niamey. Tillaberi is a smaller market, located in a producing region of 
the western part of Niger, not far from the border of Mali and Burkina Faso.  
Table 5. Most significant ADF statistics 
 AR(1) Bubble period Sub-sample size 
Agadez 0.114** 2003.07 - 2005.08 n = 25 
 (0.831)   
 0.039 1995.05 - 1998.08 n = 40 
 (0.409)**   
Diffa 0.054 1994.10 - 1998.06 n = 45 
 (0.513)**   
Dogondoutchi 0.148 1998.12 – 2002.08 n = 45 
 (0.934)**   
Dosso ns   
Filingué 0.101 2003.08 – 2005.08 n = 25 
 (0.816)**   
Gaya ns   
Goure 0.228 1996.08 – 1998.08 n = 25 
 (2.193)***   
Katako ns   
Loga 0.062 2002.10 -2005.08 n = 35 
 (0.586)**   
Maradi ns   
N’Guimi 0.055 2003.07 – 2005.07 n = 25 
 (0.574)**   
Tahoua 0.091 2002.10 - 2005.08 n = 35 
 (0.968)**   
 0.039 1994.11 -1998.07 n = 45 
 (0.445)**   
Tillaberi ns   
Zinder 0.115** 1994.12 - 1998.08 n = 45 
 (0.713)   
t-stat are in parenthesis; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level;  
Lag length selection according to Schwartz information criterion. 
ns:  non significant  
  However three periods of speculative behaviour can be distinguished on the other 
markets. First, Agadez, Filingué and N’Guimi experienced short-lived bubbles during the 
2003-2005 period, while Loga and Tahoua experienced a more persistent bubble episode 
(from October 2002 to August 2008). Second, Agadez, Diffa, Tahoua and Zinder experienced 
persistent bubbles during the period running from October 1994 to August 1998, while Gouré 
experienced a shorter episode of bubble from August 1996 to August 1998. Third, 
Dogondoutchi experienced a long bubble episode during 1999 to 2002. 
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These results support the previous asymmetry test results that detected collapsing 
phases for Dogondoutchi, Filingué, Gouré, Tahoua, Zinder, and to a lesser extent N’Guimi, 
but did not show evidence of collapsing phases for Maradi, Katako, Dosso, Gaya and 
Tillaberi. Results are unclear for Agadez, Diffa, and Loga, the rolling ADF test detecting 
expanding phases, while the asymmetry test did not show a collapse phases.   
6. Concluding remarks  
Econometric tests do not reject the existence of speculative bubbles of the PCB type 
for some of the markets under study. According to these results, the 2005 food crisis may be 
partly caused by speculative behaviour in Agadez, Filingué, Loga, N’Guimi and Tahoua. 
However, 1994-1998 should be considered as a more important period of speculation; bubbles 
detected on five markets during this period tend to be more persistent. 
Most of the markets that have experienced a bubble episode are located in deficit and 
remote areas with low income. This is particularly the case for N’Guimi and Diffa, which are 
both located in a poor region of the eastern part of the country, close to the Chad border. 
However, bubbles have also been detected in markets that are located in more favoured areas 
in terms of their geo-climatic and socio-economic conditions. This is the case of 
Dogondoutchi, Filingué, Gouré, Loga and Zinder (an important urban centre in the southern 
part of Niger). 
The most important findings concern the main millet markets of Niger which are 
Niamey (Katako), Maradi, Gaya and Dosso. The tests for asymmetry and for explosiveness in 
bubble process converge to reject the presence of rational speculative bubbles on these 
markets at the usual confidence level. As a consequence, speculative behaviour should not be 
considered as a widespread phenomenon in Niger, nor responsible for major food crises.  
The results are of particular importance for the definition of food security policy in 
Niger. Actions targeted at deficit and low income areas, which are more prone to speculation, 
should be taken. To that end, a trade expansion program aimed at reducing barriers to trade 
within the country should be a priority.  
The limits of this type of analysis are well-known. The tests for speculative bubbles 
are joint hypothesis tests of an asset price model, and of the presence of bubbles. As a 
consequence, apparent evidence for bubbles can indicate a mis-specification of the market 
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fundamental. On the contrary, rejection of the presence of partially collapsing rational bubbles 
does not rule out the possibility of other types of speculative bubbles.  
For a robustness test, the analysis has been repeated using alternative specifications for 
the fundamental value of millet. First, the international price of rice has been introduced in the 
millet fundamental equation to take into account possible substitution effects at the 
consumption level between local and imported cereals. However this price is never 
significant. Second, millet production has been introduced in the fundamental equation 
instead of the cumulative rainfall variable. The results are unchanged, except for N’Guimi 
which does not exhibit bubble characteristics anymore. Lastly, we note that ADF type tests 
are invariant to linear transformation of the series. Therefore a mis-specification of the 
bubble’s level does not alter the unit root tests. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1. Unit root tests. Sample period: January 1990 to  October 2008 
Region Market  Min Max Mean No of 
observations 
ADF  
P.value 
KPSS  
LM-Stat 
Millet price (Fcfa/kg) in:       
Agadez Agadez 52 337 134 226 0,00 0,12 
Diffa Diffa 41 328 138 221 0,00 0,09 
Diffa  Goudoumaria 45 371 131 215 0,02 0,08 
Diffa Nguimi 55 333 148 218 0,01 0,06 
Dosso Dogondoutchi 48 270 114 217 0,00 0,08 
Dosso Dosso 58 329 139 226 0,00 0,11 
Dosso Gaya 42 315 124 226 0,00 0,10 
Dosso Loga 50 279 123 216 0,00 0,07 
Maradi Maradi 39 261 104 226 0,00 0,12 
Tahoua Tahoua 54 369 144 226 0,00 0,11 
Tillaberi Filingue 51 326 129 210 0,00 0,09 
Tillaberi Tillaberi 58 306 145 226 0,00 0,11 
Zinder Goure 52 319 118 226 0,00 0,08 
Zinder Zinder 40 312 109 226 0,00 0,12 
Niamey Katako 71 324 141 226 0,00 0,09 
CPI (100 = 2005.05) 56.2 133 93.7 226 0.31 0.237 
∆(CPI)  -4.42 9.42 0.28 226 0.00 0.08 
Gasoline (Fcfa/l) 210 670 363.3 226 0.24 0.34 
∆(Gasoline)  -75 130 1.91 226 0.00 0.20 
Source: SIMA and authors' calculations. 
ADF test: H0: I(1) ; KPSS : H0: I(0). Tests implemented on current price values. 
 
 
 
Table A2.: Simulated critical values for the rolling ADF test 
 n=25 n=35 n=45 
1 percent 1.196 1.155 1.119 
5 percent 0.412 0.380 0.357 
10 percent 0.012 -0.026 -0.040 
ADF test with no constant and no trend 
n: sample size 
No. of replications: 100,000  
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The Residual Augmented Least Squares Dickey-Fuller test 
The Residual Augmented Least Squares (RALS) Dickey-Fuller test developed by 
Taylor and Peel (1998) is robust to skewness and kurtosis in the distribution of the residual 
term and is more powerful in detecting periodically collapsing bubbles. The RADF test 
equation is given by: 
tttt wBB ξγθ ++=∆ − ˆ1          (A1) 
where tuˆ are the residuals of the standard DF equation (A2):  
ttt uBB +=∆ −1φ          (A2) 
and )]ˆˆ(),ˆˆ3ˆ[(ˆ 2223 σσ −−= tttt uuuw . The vector twˆ  corrects the estimate of θ for 
skewness and excess kurtosis of the residuals. 2σˆ is the estimated variance of µt ; ξt is white 
noise.  
The test statistic is )ˆ(/ˆ θθτ VarA =  
θˆ is the estimated coefficient in Eq. (12); var(θˆ ) is the variance-covariance matrix of 
which expression is given by Sarno and Taylor (2003) as well as the critical values for Aτ . 
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Figure A1. Rolling ADF test results 
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